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Welfare State Development in Europe Since 1930:
h’eland in a CompaTntive Perspective
The development of the modern welfare state is one of
the major social and political changes in the Western countries
during the past century. Together with a group of colleagues at
the Swedish [nstitt|te for Social Research, Stockbolm University, l
have for some time been involved in a comparative study of tbis
change in 18 OECD countries. The purpose of this comparative
researcb programme is to describe welfare state development in
the Western countries, to attempt to explain tbis development,
and also to look at some of the consequences of welfare state
development.I To use tile vocabulary of T. H. Marshall ([950)
one coutd say that we are studying the development of social
rights and the emergence of social citizensbip in the Western
countries.
My lecture is based on this comparative research
programme on welfare state development. I will here begin b),
outlining tbe basic feattn’es of our comparative data base.
Thereafter I will describe some features of the development of
Western welfare states with respect to old age pensions and
sickness insurance. In this context ! will attempt to put
developments in h’eland into an international perspective, and
note some examples of what for a foreign observer appear as
peculiarities in the development of the h’ish welfare state.
Finally, 1 will take tip the question of different strategies for
equality, make an attempt to assess their relative effectiveness,
and also briefly look at developments in the labour market.
The Comparative Data Base on ~l~lfare State Development
In the comparative welfare state research pl’ogranlme we
have constructed a data base which includes Australia, Austria,
Belgittm, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, h’eland,
hal),, Japan, Tile Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and tile United States. These
are the more or less rich and indusu’ial OECD eounu’ies with a
population above one million and a history of uninterrupted
political democrat), during the post-war period. The main social
illStlr.2nce plogvatllmes in these COLiiltries have becll exalnilled
in 1930, 1933, 1939, 1947, 1950 and then every fifth year tip to
1985. Data for 1990 arc now in progress.
The programmes inchided are the five main legislated
social insurance programmes - old age pensions, sickness
instlrance, Wol’k accident il/suranee, unemploynlent instlrance,
and family benefits. These programmes are intended to provide
for ahet-native solll’ces Of incon’le Whel’l incon’*e from normal
SOtll*Ces are strained or interrupted - pernlarlently as in the case
of old age or temporarily as in terms of sickness, work accidents
or unenlployment.
We have described the development of these five
programmes in terms of the social rights they give to citizens via
legislation. Thus we bare coded and attempted to quantif), social
insurance legislation in terms of the extent to and the conditions
under which they replace lost income or provide income for
citizens.
Cenu’al aspects here concel*l) income replacenaent i’ates.
As a baseline for comparing income replacement in social
insurance progr;ullmes over time and between COtlntries, we
have chosen to relate benefits to the wage of an average
industrial worker. Such a baseline is more inforrnative and
relevant than nlost alternative olles, based for example Oll
exchange rates. Here both benefits and wages are taken net of
taxes and social security contributions. We have computed net
benefit rates for different types of households - single persons,
couples with children, and couples without children.
We have also described conditions for eligibility for
benefits - conditions in ternts of requiremenLs tbr contributions,
labour Iorce i:~articipation, waiting days before benefits are paid
out in sickness and unemplo),ment, duration of benefits, and the
financing of benefits. In addition, we have tried to determine
the coverage of social insurance, that is what proportion of
relevant population groups that have the righl to the benefit.
Here it is only possible to present to you a very small
samp|e of the data we have. I will focus on development of old
age pension and sickness insurance in a few Et~ropean cotlnu’ies,
which should be of inlerest in this context- Ireland, tile United
Kingdom, France, Germany and Sweden. In addition I will give
)’ou some averages for tile 13 European countries and for all our
18 countries.
OMAgePensions
Let us begin with old age pensions, the programme
wlfich is the Siilgle most COSI.ly one and ill i11ally wa),s a key social
insurance programme. In F.urope, besides means tested
programn~es, we find at least two other types of pension
programmes. 011e of d’tese is the classical "corporatisuc" model
of pensions, where entiLlenlents to pensions are based ozl work
requirements, different occupational groups have had different
pension schemes, and pensions al’e related to pl’eviolls incol|le.
Another type of old age pension is the so called Peoples’
Pension or Folkpension. In this model entitlements to pensions
are in principle being based on citizenship, not on work record,
and flat rate pensions have been typical. The Peoples’ pensiot’t
idea meLtllS that most citizens receive a pension, but a nfinimun~
level pension, a safer), net which does not provide income
security.2
2 Cf }L~ping-t’tlldetsen ;uld Korpi 198’1; I:sping-t~.nder~a*n ITS}0.
Replacement Rates: To what extent do pension programnles
replace previous income? We have computed different types of
replacement measures - for minlnlttna pensions, minimum work-
related pensions, pensions for a typical industrial worker with
varying degrees of labour force participation, and maximttm
pensions.
The replacement ratio I will present here is calculated in
terms of the pension a newly retired industrial worker will get,
assuming that he has just passed the normal pension age and
that he has worked for 35 ),ears. I will present replacement rates
as an average for a single person and for a married couple,
where both are above pension age but only one of the spouses
has been working (that is the classical single-earner family).
It should be noted that the replacement t,’ates here refer
to the pension for a newly retired worker. If we were to include
all elderl), citizens oJ1 pensions, the ceplacement rates ~,ould be
lower, often considerably lower. This is because man), of the
elderly have entitlements to pensions based on earlier rules,
which often have been improved Ibr later age groups.
How generous have old age pensions been? In the early
1930s, legislated old age pensions programmes existed in 13 of
our 18 countries. During the 1930s in the countries with
legislated old-age pensions, average income replacement for
pensioners ~’r, ts low, around 2.5 per cent oF at] average industrial
worker’s wage (Diagram I). It increased with about 10 per cent
in the immediate post-war years. However, the main acceleration
czune in the 1960s, in the Golden Age of western capitalism. In
spite of the post-1973 economic difficulties, the increase has
tended to continue throughout the 1980s. To a large extent this
increase reflects the naal.lll’ation of income i’elated pensioll
programmes.
As is well known, h’eland inherited the British means
tested pension programme of 1908. In h’eland in the 1930s,
replacement l’ates were above the average of the F_.tll’opeall
DIAGRAM 1. OLD AGE PENSIONS,
1930-1985:
Average net income replacement rate
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COUtatl’ie5. There were some improvements in Irish social welfare
programmes in the 1930s.3However, the peak in the h’ish
pension replacement rate indicated by our data for 1933 was not
the result of reform activity during the depression. ThroughotJt
the 19305 pensions remained at a maxinatma of 10 shillings per
week, £26 per )’ear pet- person. Changes in replacement r:.ttcs
rel]eet instead the fact that while benefiLs Wel’e unchanged, there
3 Onc:lnpll,)’mcrnt tL~i~utllce "~".L~ inll(xhl,:ed ill 1933 alld wid~,w’~ i~nsi,)ns in 1939 (Magllile) It.18G.
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was a considerable change in industrial wage levels, first a
lowering of wages in 1933 and then some increase up to 1939.
From 1939 to 1960, h’ish pension replacement rates
stagnated at around tile 30 per cent level. After 1958, however,
Ireland experienced a rather drastic change in the political
climate (l?ween et aL 1990). The introduction of the contributory
pensions in 1960 improved replacement rates considerably. Vet,
with statutory pensions based on flat rate I)enefik% in spite of
increasing benelits h’ish replacement rates could not catch up
with those in the other Western countries, where income related
progr.7|nlmes were common. There was, however, a COlasideral)Ie
increase in h’ish flat rale benefits fi’om 1980 to 1985.
Let us now COIlip.~ll’e the development o1" [rish petasions
with those in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Sweden (Diagram 2). In the 1930s Irish placement rates were at
the German level. Although both Ireland and Britain paid 10
shillings per week in old age pensions, because of the higher
wage levels in Britain, British replacement rates were
considerably lower than in h’eland. In the post-war period h’ish
pension replacement rates have followed the British ones quite
closely.
Of the countries considered here, especially Germany
but also France represent the classical corporatist model. In
Germany, all pensions have thus been tied to a work record,
requiring a minimum of 25 years of insured employment and
taking into account up to 45 years of contril)utions. This work
requirement means that a relatively large proportion of citizens -
especially women - have not been qualified for a pension. In the
1980s the German average pension level was relatively low
:ompared to that in many other countries. This reflects the [’,act
hat our figures give an average pension for a single person and
for a couple, where one of the spouses has no work record, and
thus has no pension. By 1985, Irish pension levels have thus
caught up with and surpassed the German ones. Howevel, in
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DIAGRAM 2. OLD AGE PENSIONS,
1930-1985:
Average net income replacement rote
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German), ,15 ),ears of work inste~ld o1:35 would increase
replacement I’~1t¢2s b)’ 6 -7 i)el" cent, bringing tile :tver:~ge Germazl
repl~lcement ,’ares up to the Irish level.
Jl3 FI’,qI1CC, p~nsiol’l replacement i’:lles :.llso increased in
the post-war period up to 1965. lqowever, in the French I:legi.le
Genre’ale there was a ceiling for wages taken into accottJlt. JZFom
1955 to 1975, tbis ceiling remail~ed stable. As a t’esult of ~¢age
increases above the ceiling, French pension replacement rates
dropped q~ite a bit u~til I.he ceilil~g was illcrea,~ed at the end of
the 1970s.
Tile Nordic cotmtries, irlcluding Sweden, bave been
typical exponents of the universal flat rate Peoples’ Pensions. Up
to 1955, Sweden therefore had lower replacement rates than
Ireland and many continemal I~ul"opean countries. In the 1950s
and 1960s, however, Sweden as well as Finland at’td Norway
added an incolne related work pension to the flat rate pension.
This new pension system thus combined the idea of universalism
with the idea of earnings relatedness, creating what could be
called an "institutional" model of pensions. When this
institutional system matured in tbe 1980s, Swedish pensiota
replacement levels became the highest among these 18
COUll I.l’ies,
Also in Britain, some efforts were made to add an
ear~lings related pension to the natio~al minimt~m o~le.
Attempts at such reforms did however generate political
controvc’rs): Tbe earnings related component in British pe~lsio~s
has therefore been relatively small. However, as a resuh of ata
earnings related pension J~ltroduced by the Labour government
in 1978, replacement rates in Britain increased considerably
during the Conserwltive government in the 1980s.4
In 198.5 there was considerable variation betwee~a
countries in terms OJ" pension replacement rates. Among out" 18
countries the highest replacement levels in old age pensions
were found in Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Norway, Italy and
Austria. As mentioned above, Sweden, Finland and Norway bare
complemented their flat rate Peoples’ Pensions with eart~ings
related pensions, l?,elgium, Italy and Austria represent classical
"cocporatist" pension systems with relatively strong earnings
related pensions.
’l I lel,lr we Ill tl~[ i elllellll~l- their llli5 eai’ll]l~gs I elattltd ~llpplglllell I ill I~l il~lill i~ giVell I III J}’ tO tht ~f.e
t’el:t:lltly i el~l e(I. [n ~51"it~l{ll, 1h¢2 m:~il I1" p~ll’l ill’the ~![llerly. I hl~l’efol e. Ila~’e ~mly hil{| 11112 nlillilll~llll level
fiat I~,lte pellsit ~ll. This Ill ~babl}’ expl:ti/ls the I~tl’gt: pml~}rtion tlf l:~r ;ullllllg the elderly.
Wilh a 61 per cent l’eplacement l~,te in 1985, h’eland fell
into a middle category together with Dennlark, France, New
Zealand,.iapan, USA, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The
clearly lowest replacement level was found in Austr:dia, which 17),
1985 h:ld moved back to its Iraditional means tesled pension
programHlc.
Coverage: Another :lspcct of the pension systcnl it the proportic~n
of citizerts who have a right to an inclividual pension when the),
retire. This we can refer to :is the coverage rate ofpe~zsio’lz
profframmes. In the c:lse of pensions it it reasonal]le to relate the
illlnlber of insured persons I.O l.he poptdatiort in the ;tges 15-65
ye~lrs.
In the 15 countries which had legislated old age i~ensions
iri the 1930s, about half of the citizens were insured, and thus
h:ld :l right to ~l pension when the), attained normal pension age.
This coverage r;ite increased up to arottnd 80 per cent in 1960
and has remained at that level up to 1985.
In 1985, however, pension coverage rates varied
considerably. Eight countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, The
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and New Zealzlnd)
had universal systems of basic pensions with complete coverage
of the population. In countries wilh work related pension
systems, such as.lapan, Germany, USA, Austria, France, Italy and
I?,elgium, coverage was however much lower. In Ireland, in spite
of the extension in 1973, the proportion covered 17), old age
pelasions remains among the lowest, arottl’td 50 per cent
(inchtdiog public employees).
Sic]¢lless hlsura*lce
Let us now also look at sicklleSS instll’ance, one O[" the
soci:d instwzuace progran’Ul~eS intended to protect for shol’t-lerm
losses of income. I am here concerned only wiLh C~tSll bellCfik~,
not with hospital Lreatment, etc. As is well known, h’eland took
over the 191 I British insurance programmes for sickness and
LII1elllp Jo)qllell z..
Replacement rates: In sickness insurance I will discuss the
development of average net repk~cement levels, defined as an
average of four measures: benefits for a single person with
DIAGRAM 3. SICKNESS INSURANCE,
1930-1985:
Average net income replacement rate
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respect to short-term illness (one week) as well as long-term
illness (26 weeks) and benefits for a couple with a dependent
spouse anfl I.WO nlinOl" childl’en, also here shol’t-tel’nl illness as
well as long-tm’m illness.
Among tile I I countries with legislated sickness benefits
in Ihe 1930s, net replacen~ent rates were about’f0 per cent of
tile average wage (Diagram 3). Average replacement levels
increased rather rapidly during file post-war period, especially
during the period 1960 to 1975. In the 1980s, however, average
benefit levels in sickness insurance have stagnated. This rellcclS
cut-backs of benefits in several countries during the post-1973
economic crises. Remember, however, that average old age
pension replacement rates appa]’enlly were more difficuh to cut
and continued to increase in this period.
h’ish benefik~ remained stable during tile 1930s but wage
levels varie0, giving replacement rates roughly at the European
average. After World War II, increases in h’ish Ilat rate benefik~
only barely followed the increase in average wages, resulting in a
stagnation of benefit ratios at about tile 30 per cellt level. Thus,
h’ish rcplacenmnt levels lagged behind the European average up
to 1973, when benefit.s in the h’ish sickness and unemployment
insurance were made related to previous income (with the
income related coml)onent payable after 2-3 weeks of waiting).
Thereafter, Irish replacement levels ahnost caught up with the
European average.
While Irish benefit ratios in sickness insurance were
higher than those ill Britain during tile pre-war period, in tile
1950s there was a convergence between h’ish and British
replacement levels (Diagram 4). When income related
supplements were introduced ill Britain, however, Irish benefit
ratios fell behind the l?witish ones between 1965-1975. After 1979
the Conservative government had decreased tile extent to which
benefits are income related, making them close to flat-tale
benefits.5 Therefore in the 1980s British replacement rates have
been brought down almost to their pre-war levels. At the same
time h’ish benefit levels have incre:Lsed as a result of income
rc kil.ed supplcnlents.
Since tile 1970s the highest replacement rates are fotmd
in West German),. There the regular untaxed sickness insurance
DIAGRAM 4. SICKNESS INSURANCE,
1930-1985:
Average net income replacement rate
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bellellLS w~-Is colnpJenlented with ~| w~|ge COI1LiI1LI~ILJOI1 schelne J~of
workers, which was introduced in two steps (1957 and 1969).
This Loh.forlzahht~lgs~eselz gives the full wage during the first six
weeks of illness. Thus for long-term illness, in combination the
two German systems give more than full ct)mpensaLion of wages,
with .~m average at arotulcI 1 l0 per cent.
Up Io 1955 Sweden had a voJtlnl;iry, stale-snpported
sickness illSlil’;ince SVSI.enl with very low rcphLcemcnt rales, lower
t.h;m those for example in IrelanlcI. In 1955, however, a universal
programme with income related benefils w:ls introduced. In I.he
1970s benefit levels were made laxal)le and increased to 90 per
Ceill oJ" earnings,fi In l’~l’;lllee repl~lccnlent rates have not
increased m:wkcdly tluring tile post-w~.|r period and are now
lower t.h:m in Ireland.
In the period before World War 11, differences between
countries in replacement rates were relatively limited. In the
posl-w:lr period, however, variation among the Europe;Ln
countries has increased. The full range of v:u’iation in average
repl;lcenlenl levels in our 18 eottntries in 1985 is considerable.
x,.Vt: find the highest rcplacenaent levels (at least 100 per cent) in
Germany Austria, and Norwa); where employers continue to pay
full wages during the first period of illness. In Sweden and
Finland about 90 per cent of wages were replaced. Switzerland
has a very pluralistic but state supporte¢l sickness insurance
system, with rephteement rates at’Otlnd 80 pet" cent. 7 h’ish
benefit levels (70 per cent) came in a middle category oF
countries, including Belgium, New Zealand, .Japan, Denmark,
It:dy and The Nedaerlands. The weekly earnings benefits in
13ritain were lower than the means tested belaefits in Australia.
h’ish Family Ideolog),: There is one rather unique characteristic
about betael’it levels in Irish sickness and unemph)yment
1) IIJ 1~)1 Swedi~.h t~llefil Ic".’e I~ Inawe. how c".’l: r. I~ren I~ ~,~’er Ird ~tnd am ~lhen (leon ea~4" i~ ~h~r(tllled I~w
’7 Thet e. c~ur d:lla lle~:r’il:¢ tile relatively Iglrneroet~ I:~:nelil.~ ~c~iIli~ to Ineml:~’I ’* in llle ~lrongesl tlllion
:ull~.lg wq~t kers. dir Schtt;d:.~i~clu. IJhr~J-und ,~fclallatbdt,.n~,rband.
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insurance. This is the extent to which families arc given a
privileged position in these two social insurance systems
(Diagram 5). In the 1950s rclativel), generous increments fi~r a
dependent spouse and I’o1" children were introduced in sickness
insurance.8 As a resuh, in Ireland the replacement rate for a
famil), was aboul 20-9_5 per cent higher than that for a single
DIAGRAM 5. SICKNESS INSURANCE,
1930-1985:
Net income replacement rates in Ireland
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person (,~lf[I.~l- 1973 rel~lacement t~, tes for long-term illness were
increased with an income related component).
The extent to which the family is given a favoured
position appears to be greater in h’eland than in tile other
countries. Perhaps it reflects tile strong influence of Catholic
idcologT in h’eland. The result is that for families with long-term
illness, the Irish replacement ratio at around 100 per cent is one
of the highest in Europe.
DIAGRAM 6. SICKNESS INSURANCE,
1930-1985:
Net Income replacement rate (26 weeks) for a
family with two children
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Coverage: With respect to coverage in sickness insurance, it is
reasonable to relate the number of insured to the size of the
labour force, that is to the number of citizens dependent on a
stream of earned income. Among the | 1 countries Lhat h~td
sickness insurance in 1930, coverage was around 50 per cent of
the labour force (Diagram 7). Also in sickness insurance
covel’~tge ilacl’eased durillg the first post-war decades as illstll’ance
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DIAGRAM 7. SICKNESS INSURANCE,
1930-1985:
Percentage of the labour force covered
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programnles wel’e extended to new groups. Coverage rates
reached an average of about 80 per cent of the labour force in
tile 1980s, when they stagnated.
In h’eland sickness insurarice covered emplo),ed persons
(thus not the large category of: [’armers) but excluded salaried
emplo)’ees above a certain wage ceiling as well as some other
categories of workers (seasonal work, conlmertze, agriculture,
lind domestic service), h’ish coverage levels were, Iherefore,
sonlewhat I)elow tile European average but have increased with
rough])’ the same rate as in Europe.
Tal)le I : Coverage of Sickn~s Insurance (Cash Benefits)
in l~zbour Force (%) 1985
I. l)ennlark 100
2. Finland 100
3. N orv,,ay 100
,I. Sweden 100
5. Switzerland I O0
6. Canada 89
7. France 88
8. Belgium 84
9. Ausu’ia 83
10. United Kingdom 79
I I. Italy 77
12. The NetheHands 77
13. Germany 76
14. Ireland 73
15. J:lpan 56
16. Austr:dia 0
17. New Zealand 0
18. USA 0
17
The extension of coverage in Ireland to all employees in
1973 can be noted here as a slight increase in 1975 (cf Diagt’am
7). However in 1980, covelq, ge drops somewhat. A sinlilar drop
in the 1980s can be observed also in some other countries, and
cat’J prol)ably I)e interpreted as a resuh of increasing levels of
unemployment.
If we look al the coverage of sickness cash insurance in
the labour force in our 18 countries in 1985 we find the
following picture (Table I). The Nordic countries as well as
Switzerland have universal coverage of the working population.
Coverage is high, above 80 per cent, also in Canada, France,
Belgium and Austria. With 73 i)er cent covet,’age, h’eland comes
in a middle category together with Germany The Netherlands,
ltal),, and the United Kingdom, where coverage ranges fl’om 76
to 79 per cent. The.lapanese coverage is I)elow 60 per cent. In
Australia and New Zealand onl), illeans tested programmes exist,
thus no soci:d insurance programmes. In 1992 the United States
is the only western country which lacks a national sickness
instlrallce progralll me.
Why No Corpm’ati.wn in h~sh .Social h~surance?
When I compare the institutional structures of h’ish
social insurance programmes with those in Europe, it so’ikes me
that something is missing in the Irish system. ’~’~,qaat one might
have expected to lind in a country with such a strong Catholic
church are the classical corporatist arrangements in the
instittltions of social insurance programmes. On continental
Europe such corporatist institutional arranget’nenls have
typically taken the form of different insul=mce programmes for
diffcrent occupational groups and tripartite participation by
employers, employees, and the state in the governing of social
insurance systems. Such institutional aspects have I)een clearly
visible for example in German)- Austria, haly, France, Belgium
zmd The Netherlands.
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My reading on h’ish developmenL~ indicate that at least
throughout the 1940s there have I)cen attempts to create
corporatist (in h’eland the)’ were referred to as "vocational")
instittltions, ill the constitution as well as in social insurance
systems (Wh),te, 1971; Lee, 1989). In social insurance the
National Health Insurance Society, which was in charge of
sickness insurance betwcen 1933 and 1950, apl)ears to have been
the best example o!’such a "vocational" institution.
However, in Ireland, attempts to introduce
"vocationalism" into social insurance instilutions appears to have
disappeared since the 1950s. The background to this
disappearance would not al)pear to have I)een Fully explained.
St,’ateg#e_~" for Equality
An important issue ill the development of social policy
has been the question how we should arrange social insurance
progranHnes so that we c:.ln increase equa]it), and decrease
poverty. These issues have been discussed and debated I)etween,
as well as within, various political parties but also within the
labour movements in many counu’ies. Flere we find at least three
major apl)roaches.
The means testing stratelo, argues thai by making benefiLS
ine~.lllS tested we cat] ensure that social programmes are
redistributive. In this strategT, means- or income testing is used
to guarantee that only those who are ill greatest need of pul)lic
support will be supported. "File restdt is that I)enefits are given
primarily to the poor.
It is obvious that per pound or dollar of money spent on
social programmes, the means testing su’ategy has a strong
rcdistributive effect, or what could be called a sleep
redistributive gradient. A strong reliance on such programmes
creates what - following Richard Titmuss -we call term ;t
"marginalistic" Wl)e of welfare state (Korpi, 1980a).
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[11 recent decades, the means testing strateg3, has been
well developed for example in the United States, where the
needy have been defined in terms of an official poverty line. In
President Lyndon Johnson’s "War on Poverty" in the 1960s,
serious attempts were made to assure that only those below the
official poverty line would get support.
In tile Vietnam wal, the US Air Force used the concept of
"target efficiency" to measure tile proportion of all boml)s that
actually fell on the targets. At approximately the same time,
social scientists evaluating the success of antl-poverly
programmes in the War on Poverty, also used the concept of
"target efficiency", to measure the proportion of all dollars spent
in the War on Poverty that actually fell oil tile pool, that is tile
citizens below the official poverty line. This was seen as an
important criterion for the efficiency of the programmes (Korpi,
1980b). Also in other countries the means testing su’ategy has
traditionally been a very important one in attempts to improve
tile situation of the poor.
In tile flat rate strategy it is proposed that we should
attempt to increase equality by providing all recipients with the
same benefits. Such universal flat rate benefits shotlld provide a
safety net below which no citizen is allowed to fall. This type of
argument has been relatively common not only among liberal
parties but also among social democratic parties in Europe. Such
a flat rate strategy was, of course, also central for William
Beveridge.
While both the means testing and flat rate strategies have
steep redistrlbutive gradients, in the long run, however, they are
likely to have other effects which will tend to counteract
redistribution. Citizens who have been accustomed to a relatively
high standard of living are not likely to accept a considerable fall
in their living standard when tile), get sick or when they retire.
Therefore high-income earners are likely to search for private
(individual or occupational) alternatk,es or complements to tile
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flat. rate or minimum benefits supplied b), the public sector. Such
ef[’orts in turn may tend to increase inequality.
As an alternative, therefore, the institutional strategy has
been discussed in several European countries since the 1950s.
The central idea in this strategy is that benefits should be
universal and income related. This third type of strategy thus
combines the liberal, Beveridgean idea of universalism with the
idea of earnings related benefits of the classical corporatist
programmes on continental Europe. Such an institutional
welfare st;lie would give a guarantee that in the case of illness
and old age, public programmes will secure all citizens roughl),
the same standard of living to which they have been accustomed.
When applied, for example, to old age pensions it. has
thus been argtted in support of the flat rate strateg), that we
should create equalit)’ among citizens at least in old age by giving
evcr),bod), the same pension irrespective of their previous
earnings. Those being in favour of universal and earnings
related pensions have admitted that in the short run the effects
of such a strategy would appear to be to conserve inequalities
created in the labour market. However, the proponents of this
institutional strategy maintain that in the long run public
programmes of the institutional type will have equalising effects
by limiting the scope of private or market-based programmes,
which are likely to generate much more inequality.
The issue here boils down to a trade-off between two
factors. On the one hand we have the redistributivc gradient of
the public sector, that is the proportion of each pound or dollar
spent that f.~lVOtlrs the poor more than the rich. Oi1 Lhe other
hand we have the total size of the public sector, or the number of
pounds or dollars that can be used for redistribution. Where the
public sector is large, a much lower degree of redistribution is
reqttired to achieve the same amount of redistribution than
where tile public sector is small (Aberg, 1989).
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Public SlrategTes and Pffvate Solutions
From various sources we can put together empirical data
of relevance for illuminating tile question wllicll of the strategies
discussed above are best suited for limiting inequality among
citizens. Let us begin by looking at the extent to which different
legislated pension progtnmmaes have generated private pension
[)rogrammes, inclividual or occupational ones. An important
factor in this context is the level of the maximum pensions
attainable within the public systems. The higher the income
levels which can be protected within public systems, the smaller
would the incentive to establish private pension programmes
appear to be.
In our data base set we have inclucled information on
maximum pensions available within public pension systems. This
maximum pension can be expressed as a percentage of t.he
average worker’s wage. For one year, 1980, we have also
information on the size of pl’ivate pension expenditure as
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. For 1980, we can
thus relate the maximum extent to which public pension
programmes replace previous wages, and the extent to which
private or non-public pension programmes have developed in
the various countries (Diagram 8).
In our 18 countries public pension systems differ
considerably in terms of the maximunl earnings that can be
replaced. Maximum replacement rates of more than 100 per
cent of an average worker’s wage were found in Austria, Italy,
Finland, and Germany.9 At the othel" extreme, maximum
replacement rates were only about 50 per cent on" less in
Ausu-alia, Canada, Swi~erland, Denmark, the United Kingclom,
lu’eland and New Zealand.
ha spite of a few "outliers", there is an observable
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relationshiI) between the level of m~cnimunl public pensions and
the size o1" private (individual or collective) pension schemes as a
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Thus in
Finland, Austria, and hal)’, where maximum levels in i)enslons
related to previous income constitute about 1_90-170 per ccllL of
an aw,~r;agc indtlstrial worker’s net wage, private pel]SiOI]$ al’e OJ:
very small iml)ortance and make up only about 0.2 per cent of
the GDP. In these countries, apparently high income earners
DIAGRAM 8. MAXIMUM PUBLIC PENSIONS AND RELATIVE
EXPENDITURE ON PRIVATE PENSIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
(AROUND 1980)
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also can get a public pension which tile), regard as sufficiently
high so that they do not have to look [or private pensions to
complement tile i)ublic ones.
Private pension schemes are of medium importance in
Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Belgium. There nlaxinlum public
pensions are relatively high, about 80-100 per cent of an average
workcr’s wagc.
In Swilzerland, Australia, Canada, USA, Denmark, The
Netherlands, and Bvilain, however, maximum i)ttblic pensions
replace only about 50 per cent of an average worker’s net
inconle. In these countries high income eacners have tht:rcfore
seen il necessary to complement the low public pensions wil.h
private pensions. In Ihcst: countries cxpendilures for privale
pcHsions constilute I-2 per cent of the GI)P, abottt ten times as
much as in Italy, Finland and Austria.
There are some "otttliers" in this diagram, however. The
relatively large role of privatc pensions in Gernl:Ul), probably
i’c~ccts that top inconlc cal’l]crs ~|s well ;is housewives are
excluded from the public pension schemes and therefore are
forced to use private altern~ltives. In the other direction, New
Zealand has limited private pensions in spite of low nlaximutn
pt~blic pensions. Also in Ireland private pensions could have
been expected to be more common, considering tile low
maximttm replacement rates in the public pension s)’stems. In
the 1980s, however, private pension s),stems appear to have been
increasing in h’eland.
Do Policy Stmtegqes Affect h*come Inequality ?
The next question is what effccts different combinations
of public and private pension s,vstems have for income inequality
a111011g the elclerly? From the so callecl Luxemburg Inconle
Study data base, we can get information on Ihe composition of
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income for pensioners in nine different countries around 1980
(Kangas atld Palme, 1993).
Let us first look at public pensions mid measure income
inequality in pul)lic pension income among those 65 years or
older using the Gini coefficient (Diagram 9).1° We lind then that
DIAGRAM 9. INEQUALITY IN PUBUC PENSIONS IN NINE
COUNTRIES (GINI, AROUND 1980)
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the means tested Australian pension programme is actuall), the
most strongly redistributive one. As means tested progranmaes
are expected to do, Australian public pensions thtts give more to
elderly persons with low gross income than to those with higher
gross income. Public pension programmes have some
reclistril)utive effecLs also in Canada and in the United Kingdom.
In Finland, Sweden, Germany and Norway, on the
contrary, public pension income is much nlore unequally
distributed. In these countries those with higher total income get
tntlch higher pensiolls than persons with lower total earnings. In
the United States and The Netherlands, pul)lic pension income
is less unequally disu’ibuted.
However, if we look at the distributiotl of total income
among tile elderly in these nine countries, the picture changes
drastically (Diagram 10). Inequality in total income among the
elderly is actually smallest in Finland, Sweden, Norway and
Germany, tile countries where inequalities in public pension
income is largest. On the other hand, inequality in total income
is c~.~nsiclerably higher in Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and The Netherlands, tile countries where public
pension programmes in themselves are most clearly
redistributive or neutral.
These results thus indicate that the efl’ecl~s of different
forms of public pension programmes on income inequality
zmlong the elderly come in different stages. In fact their most
important effects are likely to be felt before public pensions are
paid out to the elderly. In cotmu-ies with re¢lisu’il)otive but low
maximttm public pensions, groups of citizens accustomed to
relatively high incomes have found it necessary to complement
low public pensions with private or collective pensions, or with
other t}’])es of incolne, lneollle fl’Olll StlCh SOl_lrces tencls to be
much more unequally clistributed than income fl’om most pttblic
pension programmes, also from those which have the highesl
level of inequality. Thus, in countries where public pension
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sch12111e5 }|l’e flat rate or means tested, they tend to be
rcdistributive oll paper o111},.
Political Cml.wquences of WelJhre State Institutions
Different institutional structures of the well,ire state ma),
also have important political effects, including ef[ects on the
political support I’~w the welfare state. Since marginalistic social
programmes tend to generate conflicting interests among
citizens, in this type oF welfare state the eleetorale tends to be
DIAGRAM 10. INEQUAUTY IN GROSS INCOME AND IN PUBLIC
PENSION AMONG THE ELDERLY IN NINE COUNTRIES
(AROUND 1980)
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split in terms of views on social policy programmes. Especially
significant here is the split that the poverty line tends to create
within the working class (Diagram II). If welfare state benefits
go primarily to those below a poverty line, the better-off sections
among workers have little incentive to SUl)port such
programmes. Instead they are likely to join with the middle class
in a coalition against the poor. The marginalistic welfare state
thtls creates a large constituency for a "welfare backlash",
something which h~s been noted, for example, in the United
States.
DIAGRAM 11. MARGINAL WELFARE STATES CREATE A LARGER
CONSTITUENCY FOR "WELFARE BACKLASH" THAN
INSTITUTIONAL WELFARE STATES
Marginal Institutional
Top
Incomes
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In the institutional type of welPare state, on the contrary,
all categories of households have at least some direct benefits
fi’om social policy progranmles. By defending what they have
come to perceive of as Iht;ir oron inlmesl.~ in existing mliversal and
income related social policy I)rogrammes, the better-off citizens
are also defending the interests of the poor. Therel)y, the
constituency for a welfare backlash is decreased. As, for exmnple,
successive governments in Sweden have discovered, in an
institutional lype of welfare state it is very difficult to introduce
cut-backs since most citizens feel that this is a threat to their own
legitimate interesLs. The poor are thus not left to their interests
alone.
U’nemJJloyme~zt and Labom Ma:rket Policies
Since the mid-1970s, mass unemployment has returned
to Europe. In terms of tmemployment levels we are now back to
the years before World War 11. The post-war period, when most
Western countries (but Ireland, Italy, the United States and
Canada to a lesser degree than others) had full employment
(defined as 2-3 per cent of unemployment) have now passed
(Korpi, 1989). We are in the process ofestal)lishing what in
Germany has been called "the two-thirds society", that is a socieg,
wiaere two-thirds o[ citizens are qttile well off but the remaining
third is excluded from employment and a normal place in
society.
In spite of the protracted boom during the 1980s, the
average unemployment levels in the Common Market countries
have ranged around 10 per cent. In 1992, in the OECD area the
number of the unenlployed is about 30 million persons, almost
ten times the size of the hish population. In addition, ill several
countries more than one-half of men above 5fi years of age have
been forced Otlt of elnl)loyment. In many COUlltries the increase
of labour force participalion of women has been slowed down or
hahed.
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In the 1950s, lil)erals such as William Beveridge but also
many olhers took it for granted that tile absence of mass
unemployment was a defining characteristic of a welfare state. In
the 1980s this defining characteristic has disappeared in most
European cotllltries.
However, social policy and lal)oor market policy is of
some relevance also in this situation. Of particular importance is
Ihe difference between passive and active labour market policies.
Passive labour market policies pay a more or less generous
compensation to Ihe unemployed, either through
unemployment insurance or through pre-retirement pensions.
Active labour market policies give occupational training or
create jobs, such as special programmes for youth and Ibr long-
term unemployed. Thereby, tile)’ have much more positive
consequences for the situation of tile unemployed as well as for
human capital in terms of occupational skills.
What is often forgotten, however, is that the costs for
active labour market policies generally are not higher l:laan for
the passive ones, at least if one pays tile tmeml)loyed a decent
compensation. Yet nlost countl’ies Contilltle to spend most of
their money in passive programmes. In several European
countries in the 1980s, the costs for such passive policies have
been roughly of tile size of costs for military defence, a few of
them even higher.
Together with Spain, h’eland is the country in Europe
where unemployment has been the highest, around 15-16 per
cent (Table 2).II h’eland spends a sizeable prol)ortion of its
GDP (in 1990, 4.3 per cent) on labour market programmes.
About two-thirds of these expenditures were used For "passive"
unemployment compensation and one-third for "acl.ive" policies,
such as labour market training, youth measures, and subsidised
employment. Here Ireland follows a relatively common
European pattern of allocating most expenditure on passive
measures. In gel’lllany, active measures have accounted for a
I l Dam frl,ln OECl) I~.)1. Empbtymmtt Outll~k.
3O
qable 2: Unemployment and ILvpenditure on Labour MaTha
Programmes 1990
Unemployment
(%)
Expenditure ~f which
Labour Madtet Active Lalmur
Prog~’amnte_~ Marhet Polic.ies
(% of coe) ( % of total expendit rt re)
Ireland 15.8 4.3 3,t
UK 6.8 1.5 ,t0
France* 9.4 2.7 28
Germany ,I.9 2.2 ,I 7
Sweden 1.5 2.3 70
* 1989
Source: 012(2), Employtmmt Outlook 1991.
somewhat larger share of expenditttres. This has 11105| clearly
been the case in Sweden, where the bulk of expenditures have
tradiLionall)’ been directed towards active measures and tq:) I.o
1991, open tmemplo),ment has been kept relativel), low. 12
In closing I would like to remind you about the debate
that is going on among social scientists as well as among
politicians about the mixed blessings of the welfare state. As you
are well aware, there is a long tradition of questioning the
benefits of welfare state growth. Especially among economists of
a neo-classical bent, many have pointed to the possible negative
31
consequences of tile welfare state for economic efficiency and
economic growth. Thus, For example, some years ago Arthtn"
Okun (1975) the late American economist, used tile image of
"the leaky bucket" to indicate how tile welfare state wastes
resources on the way when moving diem from the rich to tile
ROOF via taxation and social policies.Is
Those of you who have faith in the hypothesis of "the
leak), I)ucket" may find some comfort in tile figures which I have
presented here. Ireland would not appear to have been in the
most dangerous risk zone, so to speak, when it comes to leakage
of economic resources via all overdeveloped welfare state.
Several other countries would appear to have I)een taking
greater risks in the welfare state area during tile post-war period.
Oil tile other hand, those of you who set value on social
citizenshil), as it was once expounded by T. H. Marshall, may
perhaps also find some hope in the data I have presented. When
the h’ish compare themselves with their great neighbour in the
east, tile}, will notice that Irish pension levels for the elderly are
of about tile same quality. In addition, Irish sickness and
tnlemploynlent insurance programmes now have considerably
higher benefits than the British ones. Thtts, during the post-war
period h’eland has been steadily moving, although with varying
. speed, in the direction of improved social rights and tile
extension of social citizenship.
I -~ Fl~r empirical data of r ele~mce fol c~flttatlng tile "leaky bucket’ hypt,thesis, of. f.v example Con te
and Darrat 1~.18~.~, anll Korpi It.~85.
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